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BOOK REVIEWS

“THE QUESTION IS . . . WHICH IS TO BE MASTER—THAT’S ALL.”
The War for the Seas: A Maritime History of World War II, by Evan Mawdsley. New Haven, CT:
Yale Univ. Press, 2019. 600 pages. $32.50.

It is a daunting task to attempt to write
a single-volume history of World War
II at sea from 1939 to 1945, covering all
the participants in all the theaters of that
global conflict. I am intimately aware of
the many pitfalls that await the historian
who has the hubris to try, since I too
wrote a book on this topic, published two
years ago (World War II at Sea, Oxford
Univ. Press, 2018). I therefore applaud
Evan Mawdsley of Glasgow University
for taking up the challenge. It is a bit
delicate for a reviewer to evaluate a book
so similar to one that he himself has
written, but since the works complement
one another, I think it can be done fairly.
Interestingly, both books divide the war
into five parts of about five chapters
each. The fact that the authors did
this independently suggests that the
war in fact can be differentiated into
identifiable phases: the European war,
Britain alone, the global war at sea, the
growing Allied domination, and the
final victory. Each of us also covered
the Battle of the Atlantic, or the war on
trade, in three chapters embedded in
separate parts of the narrative; this too
suggests that we are on to something.
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The first decision the writer of any
complex subject has to make is whether
to approach it chronologically or topically. World War II was, after all, a huge,
sprawling conflict, so telling its maritime
story in sequence means bouncing
around from theater to theater all over
the globe. Mawdsley instead chooses the
topical approach, offering separate chapters on naval aviation, intelligence, and
amphibious warfare, for example. This
allows him to develop themes and follow
through with the consequences of one or
another technology or decision. On the
other hand, that approach compels him to
insert periodic notes into the text indicating that issues raised while developing
particular themes were “discussed previously,” “have already been described,” or
are forthcoming, “as will be seen.” These
create a kind of narrative speed bump,
especially for those not grounded in the
chronological structure of the war.
Another decision concerns coverage.
Including every convoy, skirmish, and
naval confrontation in the war would
transform the book into a compendium
or an encyclopedia rather than a history.
And, of course, including more of the
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smaller actions necessarily means devoting less space to the critically important
ones. Coverage is always a delicate matter,
for while leaving something out invites
criticism that the book is incomplete,
limiting coverage of the critical turning
points invites criticism of another kind.
Mawdsley has chosen to be inclusive,
and he covers a number of events that
are overlooked in most general histories
(including my own), such as the British
raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway
(Operation CLAYMORE) in 1941 and
the invasion of Madagascar (Operation
IRONCLAD) in 1942, as well as extensive
coverage of the Soviet navy in both the
Baltic and Black Seas. All that comes
with a cost, of course; running to six
hundred pages, Mawdsley’s book is
not short, and yet it occasionally feels
crowded as events pile up on one
another—although no doubt that is how
the war felt to those who fought it as well.
Mawdsley is not afraid to make judgments. He argues, for example, that the
role of “special intelligence” (ULTRA)
has been greatly exaggerated and
that Hitler gave up on the invasion of
England (Operation SEA LION) before the
Battle of Britain even began. He defends
Churchill’s decision to attack the French
fleet at Mers el-Kébir, asserting that it
was “correct” (p. 71), and concedes that
the Dieppe raid was “badly planned,”
for which Mountbatten “deserves
some blame” (p. 282). In the Pacific,
Mawdsley concludes that Kimmel and
Short were “rightly held responsible”
for being unready on 7 December
1941 (p. 182) and that Nagumo was
“surely right” not to approve a third aerial
attack against Pearl Harbor (p. 181).
It would be inappropriate for me to
recommend one of these books over
the other. Therefore I merely will
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suggest here that those interested
in the naval war from 1939 to 1945
should read (and buy) both of them.
CRAIG L. SYMONDS

Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer
for Senior Leaders, by Thomas P. Galvin. Carlisle,
PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018. 120
pages. Available for download at publications
.armywarcollege.edu/. Free.

As Charles D. Allen states in the foreword, “70 to 80 percent of organizational
change efforts fail” (p. vii). Numerous
reasons exist why initiatives to improve
an organization’s performance, effectiveness, or morale do not succeed: incorrect
problem diagnosis, poor planning or
resourcing, strategy mismatch to culture,
and resistance, among others. U.S.
Army War College professor Thomas
P. Galvin’s well-researched primer
effectively distills numerous organizational change philosophies and strategies
into a practical and intuitive guidebook
for military professionals at all levels.
A plethora of books on organizational
change exists, with an Amazon.com
search returning hundreds of results.
Professor Galvin tailors his approach to
the unique challenges of the military,
which prepares for an uncertain future
environment that before the crucible
of operations and combat can only be
simulated. He argues that most change
efforts are too process oriented, at the
expense of the often-overlooked context
of the environment and the content
of the change effort, which explain
its purpose and the path to success.
To this end, he develops a framework
similar to the military’s planning process
that emphasizes context and content,

2

